Skip navigation

putin IS MURDERER

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://oldena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/51553
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorUlmer, M.
dc.coverage.temporal25–27 жовтня 2018 року, Львів
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-05T08:07:12Z-
dc.date.available2020-06-05T08:07:12Z-
dc.date.created2018-11-25
dc.date.issued2018-11-25
dc.identifier.citationUlmer M. The efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power / M. Ulmer // Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, 25–27 жовтня 2018 року, Львів. — Львів : Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2018. — С. 243–245.
dc.identifier.isbn978-966-941-235-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/51553-
dc.format.extent243-245
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherВидавництво Львівської політехніки
dc.relation.ispartofМаркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, 2018
dc.relation.ispartofMarketing and logistics in the system of management, 2018
dc.titleThe efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power
dc.typeConference Abstract
dc.rights.holder© Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2018
dc.rights.holder© Ulmer M., 2018
dc.contributor.affiliationКиївський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка
dc.format.pages3
dc.identifier.citationenUlmer M. The efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power / M. Ulmer // Marketing and logistics in the system of management, 25–27 zhovtnia 2018 roku, Lviv. — Lviv : Vydavnytstvo Lvivskoi politekhniky, 2018. — P. 243–245.
dc.relation.references1. Addis, A. (2003). Economic sanctions and the problem of evil. Human Rights Quarterly, 573-623.
dc.relation.references2. Allen, S. H., & Lektzian, D. J. (2013). Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 121-135.
dc.relation.references3. Baldwin, D. A., & Pape, R. A. (1998). Evaluating economic sanctions. International Security, 23(2), 189-198.
dc.relation.references4. Doxey, M. (1980). Economic sanctions: benefits and costs. The World Today, 36(12), 484-489.
dc.relation.references5. Drury, A. C. (2000). US presidents and the use of economic sanctions. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 623-642.
dc.relation.references6. Gompert, D. C., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce.
dc.relation.references7. Hovi, J., Huseby, R., & Sprinz, D. F. (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?. World Politics, 57(4), 479-499.
dc.relation.references8. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.
dc.relation.references9. Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. (1981). The prince. Harmondsworth, Eng. ; New York, N.Y. : Penguin Books,
dc.relation.references10. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review, 50(4), 370.
dc.relation.references11. Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International security, 22(2), 90-136.
dc.relation.references12. Pape, R. A. (1998). Why economic sanctions still do not work. International Security, 23(1), 66-77.
dc.relation.references13. Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 5(3), 248-267.
dc.relation.referencesen1. Addis, A. (2003). Economic sanctions and the problem of evil. Human Rights Quarterly, 573-623.
dc.relation.referencesen2. Allen, S. H., & Lektzian, D. J. (2013). Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 121-135.
dc.relation.referencesen3. Baldwin, D. A., & Pape, R. A. (1998). Evaluating economic sanctions. International Security, 23(2), 189-198.
dc.relation.referencesen4. Doxey, M. (1980). Economic sanctions: benefits and costs. The World Today, 36(12), 484-489.
dc.relation.referencesen5. Drury, A. C. (2000). US presidents and the use of economic sanctions. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 623-642.
dc.relation.referencesen6. Gompert, D. C., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce.
dc.relation.referencesen7. Hovi, J., Huseby, R., & Sprinz, D. F. (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?. World Politics, 57(4), 479-499.
dc.relation.referencesen8. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.
dc.relation.referencesen9. Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. (1981). The prince. Harmondsworth, Eng. ; New York, N.Y. : Penguin Books,
dc.relation.referencesen10. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review, 50(4), 370.
dc.relation.referencesen11. Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International security, 22(2), 90-136.
dc.relation.referencesen12. Pape, R. A. (1998). Why economic sanctions still do not work. International Security, 23(1), 66-77.
dc.relation.referencesen13. Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 5(3), 248-267.
dc.citation.conferenceXІI Міжнародна науково-практична конференція "Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту"
dc.citation.journalTitleМаркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції
dc.citation.spage243
dc.citation.epage245
dc.coverage.placenameЛьвів
dc.coverage.placenameLviv
Appears in Collections:Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту. – 2018 р.

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
2018_Ulmer_M-The_efficacy_of_economic_243-245.pdf279.85 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
2018_Ulmer_M-The_efficacy_of_economic_243-245__COVER.png456.11 kBimage/pngView/Open
Show simple item record


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.