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THE EFFICACY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE COERCIVE INSTRUMENTS BETWEEN HARD AND SOFT POWER

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One challenge within literature involving the efficacy of economic sanctions is that when disputes arise between those in favor of economic sanctions and those opposing them, seldom are economic sanctions considered from a perspective of available alternatives. Research gaps involve perceiving economic sanctions as a singularity of coercive measures and with no other option for substitution. We perceive this research methodology to be narrow in scope and view. On the other hand, we offer alternatives to be compared for substitution purposes, and/or considered for their usefulness in support or in sequence to the imposition of economic sanctions.

In order to compare these alternatives and their competitive effectiveness, we developed a framework that characterized features of each hard, coercive, or soft power alternative. We use Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in order to detail the behaviors of each alternative and how they target the needs and wants of a competitor to various degrees of intensity.


While considering the graphic below, leadership that is imposing influence on others (the agent) directs its interests on a target. We note that with respect to the agent’s interests and needs, the agent may attempt to influence the target proportionally bearing in mind the target’s own particular interests and needs. Influence may involve soft power instruments that will help the target self-actualize-this is a collaborative alternative. On the other hand, if the agent feels that his interests or needs are threatened by the behavior of his target, he may choose to influence the target horizontally with proportional force or he may escalate the intensity of force in the direction of hard power. For example, in the vertical center of the graphic, the agent may challenge the social connections and networks that his target engages for social needs (if the agent’s own social networks are breached). This alternative is more competitive (coercive) as

it involves appealing to the interests of the target’s friends in lieu of the target’s unique interests and needs. The same agent may, in another situation, determine that its interests or needs are being significantly challenged by a target and therefore must select a reciprocal coercive instrument that challenges the safety of the target, and/or its physiological needs (through the use of force). So the spectrum of power from soft to hard alternatives of force are proportionally measured against a target’s wants and needs ranging from physiological to self-actualization. Taking into consideration one’s needs and interests in reference to the behaviors and actions of a target on course to achieving his needs and interest, we created this model in order to illustrate the nexus and balance of power with needs. Using this concept we evaluate the effectiveness of coercive instruments as they challenge the interest and needs of a target.

If coercive instruments limit the interests and needs of a target, we merely need to position each alternative and its characteristics on an interval that measures the intensity of appealing to need-driven targets on one side, or want-driven targets on the other. In this way, we discriminate between alternatives in terms of desired goals, proportionality to disobedient behavior, time sensitivity, and usefulness in support/substitution of other coercive instruments.

We therefore analyzed the following coercive instruments in comparison to efficacy of economic sanctions: Punitive political measures, covert operations, grey/black propaganda, constriction of trade (manipulation), cyber-attacks, support for adversaries’ opponents, support for nonviolent internal opposition, aid for political opposition, resource denial (energy), maritime intercept, and military embargoes.

We found that economic sanctions are effective when considering them in relation to other coercive instruments. They offer ambiguity in terms of targeting an adversary’s needs and wants, they are versatile as they can be used in early stages of coercion to target the interests of an adversary, and inversely, can be imposed aggressively during stages of escalation. If a target’s interests impede the needs or interests of others, economic sanctions may be used in order to defer and deter such advances of interests. They are influential when used to target the defense/military complex of an adversary by depriving the enemy of access to signals devices, and other technologies that blur lines of civilian versus combat use. They distribute responsibility of behavior on those who disobey, and may catalyze opposition from within if used in concert with other coercive instruments. Finally, they are very agile instruments.



(Left) The agent’s needs and power vs. The target’s needs and power (Right)

Picture 1. The Balance of Power and Needs between the Agent and Target

Economic sanctions can be quickly imposed multilaterally as those who have the influence to coerce economically are few in number and share similar political interest. We hope that further research considers the efficacy of economic sanctions across a spectrum of alternatives in lieu of the performance of

economic sanctions in isolation. And we anticipate that further research, if considered from a perspective of coercive alternatives to economic sanctions, will help us to make more informed decisions as stewards of peace and safety.

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МЕТОДИ ОЦІНКИ МАРКЕТИНГОВОГО РОЗВИТКУ ПІДПРИЄМСТВА

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У науковій літературі є багато методів оцінки маркетингового розвитку підприємства, які характеризуються відповідними функціональними базисами та алгоритмами оцінювання. Аналітичні можливості цих методів надають можливість визначити стан маркетингового розвитку господарюючого суб'єкта на визначений момент часу, темпи його зміни, а також дозволяють отримати прогноз структурних змін маркетингового розвитку із урахуванням особливостей потокового виробництва, диверсифікації напрямів господарської діяльності та ін.

У таблиці 1 охарактеризовані методи оцінки маркетингового розвитку підприємства.

Таблиця 1. Порівняльний аналіз методів оцінювання рівня маркетингового розвитку підприємства

Назва класифікаційних груп	Сутність методів	Переваги методів	Недоліки методів
1	2	3	4
Методи, що передбачають розрахунок інтегрального показника рівня розвитку підпри	Передбачають розрахунок акумульованого поліфакторного показника	1. Дають єдину узагальнену оцінку 2. Не потребують значних зусиль в аналізі результатів досліджень	1. Узагальнена оцінка не надає широких можливостей, щодо встановлення структурно-диференційованих стратегічних пріоритетів маркетингового розвитку підприємства