well as the right to save their lives by other people according to the existing moral and legal norms in the society, the right that the law will not contain any grounds for arbitrary deprivation of life, the right to dispose of life at its own discretion, including and expose it to the risk and require so that natural processes were dying on their own in the final stages of fatal illness or injury and life artificially continued [2, p. 117–118].

There ore, human right to life should be understood as the subjective right, which implies a measure of possible behavior regarding the use of life as a social good, envisaged by the individual, his biological existence and self-development. The legal clarification of the human right to life takes into account various aspects, given that the law under study is a fundamental human right and has a rather complicated internal and external structure.

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DECISION-MAKING IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND MATERIAL DEPRIVATION

Multiple studies find that providing income transfers to women has a stronger impact on particular household outcomes than providing income transfers[1] to men. These outcomes include child health and higher household expenditure on nutrition, health, and housing (e.g., Bobonis, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Lee and Pocock, 2007; Lundberg et al., 1997; Lundberg and Ward-Batts, 2000; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). The mechanisms underlying this impact remain an active research area (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007). Specifically, the mechanism underscored in much of the recent work is that transfers to women enhance women's empowerment so that household expenditures become more in line with women's preferences which are more pro-family and pro-child than men's (e.g., Duflo, 2012; Bobonis, 2009). Nevertheless, several studies do not find a strong positive association between women's income and household living conditions (e.g., Braido et al. (2012); Haushofer and Shapiro (2016); Thomas (1990)). Thus, there is some doubt regarding the conventional mechanism behind the effects of women-targeting income transfers targeted to women. This paper provides additional evidence that questions the logic of the conventional mechanism and supports an alternative interpretation.

The conventional explanation that the positive effects of targeting income transfers to women result from women empowerment would be correct under two assumptions. First, the income transfers targeted to women should be correlated with women's control in the household. Second, conditional on women's control, these transfers should not be correlated with other determinants of household outcomes (Cameron and Triverdi, 2005)[2]. Based on evidence in the literature, I conclude that the first assumption holds. However, the findings of this study combined with findings in the literature suggest that the second assumption might not hold. Specifically, in my analysis of Eurostat data I find that male control is also correlated with household material conditions. Few other studies also find that the income transfers to women also change the extent of male control in

[1] Income transfer mainly refers to cash transfer programs (e.g., Bolsa Alimentação or PROGRESA), but also to transfers during field experiments or incomes brought by price shocks in markets of female-specific crops (cultivated only by women).

[2] In other words, the studies estimating the impact of income transfers targeted to women use presence of these transfers as a proxy variable for women control. The two mentioned assumptions that presence of the transfers should be correlated with women empowerment and not correlated with other determinants of the household outcomes are correspondingly the relevance and the redundancy assumptions made about the proxy variable.

the household. Another study (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016) finds that cash transfers do not affect female empowerment in households, but their measure of female empowerment is based on reported instances and attitudes to domestic violence. Therefore, income transfers to women affect male control and female control simultaneously while each is independently related to household material conditions. Thus, it may not be accurate to ascribe the effects of women-targeting income transfers to women empowerment alone[3].

In this research, I employ direct measures of household decision control, instead of income-based proxies. Further, unlike the existing work on household living conditions, which focuses on shares of specific goods on total household expenditures, I study direct measures of material deprivation and ask about their relationship to the nature of household decision making. The analysis is based on EU-SILC data from 2010, covering 18 EU member countries. The ability to measure both household control structure and relevant household outcomes directly affects the results qualitatively. As in most existing studies, women's relative income is strongly associated with better household outcomes and this association turns out to be robust to controlling for direct measures of decision-making control in the household. However, predominant male control over decisions and, even more so, predominant female control is associated with worse material conditions of the household compared to the balanced control of household decision making[4]. Most of the existing work implicitly assumes that changes in female control are necessarily accompanied by equivalent and opposite changes in male control[5]. However, the EU-SILC data suggest that female and male control can increase simultaneously when both partners start deciding on more items, i.e., when the overlap of their spheres of responsibility expands. An alternative explanation is that the observed effects are driven by an increased collaboration of household members, i.e., by increase in the balanced control. In this paper, I attempt to verify this conjecture.

The EU-SILC data does not allow me to study the association of windfall income and female and male control. Moreover, my OLS results could be affected by measurement error or reverse causality. Thus, to shed more light on the negative association of unbalanced control and household income, I instrument for the observed mode of decision-making using the share of 4-year-olds in formal childcare, the gender-gap in unemployment, and the gender-gap in weekly work-hours. The results of the IV estimation are in accord with the baseline OLS results supporting the notion that the mode of decision-making affects material status of households.

To further support the main argument that income transfers do not affect household outcomes only through female empowerment, I show that the degree to which household members pool their incomes is not closely related to the allocation of control over spending decisions. However, for the conventional interpretation to be correct, households which do not pool income should be much more likely to make decisions separately. This is because individual transfers to households which pool income should not make a difference as it is not important who exactly receives income when it is pooled. Moreover, households which do not pool incomes should be much more likely to make decisions separately because if they make decisions collectively, it matters less if they pool income or not[6]. Nevertheless, the share of households making decisions collectively among those who do not pool incomes is about the same as among those who do. This last finding also contributes to the two strands of empirical literature: the literature that tests the unitary model of the household, and in the socio-economic literature that explores the management of finances in families.

The EU-SILC 2010 data contains responses about the shares of partners' individual income contributed to a common pool. I find households that pool income are more likely to use a more

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[3] In addition, Tommasi (2017) finds that positive effects of cash transfers to women in the Mexican PROGRESA program are mostly driven by a subsample of women who already controlled most of household resources before the transfer. However, if the conventional explanation was accurate, these results would be driven instead by a subsample of women who do not possess significant control over household resources before the transfer.

[4] In Section 4, I indirectly test for the possibility that this association is a consequence of reverse causality and reject this notion.

[5] This is the case in the framework of collective models; see, e.g., Almås (2015).

[6] Some studies, however, mention the “labelling effect” or “spending inertia” (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007) which characterize income transfers. However, these effects are not large and the evidence is scarce.

balanced decision-making mode. This finding is important to the literature on the unitary model of the household and the family finance literature. In particular, it underlies concerns expressed in the family finances literature that households with no income pooling are likely to end up in a situation in which there is significant inequality between household members (Elizabeth, 2001; Pahl, 2005). Moreover, it is clear that not all households pool income, thus violating the assumption of the unitary model[7].

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KAZAKHSTAN'S YOUTH IN THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGES IN SUBCULTURES: PRO-SOCIAL OR COUNTER-SOCIAL

Certain values influence the formation of youth subcultures and social worlds. Subsequently, within the framework of the functioning of subcultures, an axiology common to them only is noticeable.

The main difference between subcultures and their concept is a separate axiology, its own values in the field of perception of reality and definition of situations that can be manifested both in specific behavior, social activity, as well as externally – in the style of clothing and artistic creativity (especially, in music).

[7] The fact that partners pool income implies that they behave as if they have common arguments in their utility functions or even a common utility function. If they did not, none would pool individual income because a partner could take it all for personal use.