

ANTIBOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE IN UKRAINE IN THE EARLY 20-th CENTURY

© Плазова Т. І., 2014

Період національного державотворення в Україні на початку ХХ ст., зокрема в 1917–1921 рр., від часу проголошення Незалежності України викликає значне зацікавлення серед науковців, політичних та державних діячів. Проаналізовано особливості військово-політичної стратегії керівництва УНР щодо продовження антибільшовицької боротьби після остаточної втрати території України восени 1920 року. Актуальністю цієї проблеми є, безперечно, необхідність об'єктивного висвітлення історичного минулого України для виховання підрастаючого покоління, для культивування у його середовищі національних військових традицій визвольних змагань 1917–1921 рр., особливо сьогодні, коли знову дуже гостро стоїть питання територіальної цілісності та державності України.

Аналізуючи військово-політичне становище в Україні восени 1920 р., необхідно відмітити, що його зумовлювали три найважливіші фактори. Перший – зовнішньополітичний, пов'язаний із спробами уряду УНР включити українське питання у польсько-радянські переговори у Ризі щодо визнання радянською Росією легітимності останнього і формального визнання незалежності УНР. Другий фактор безпосередньо впливав із першого й стосувався військово-стратегічної ситуації Армії УНР на польсько-радянському фронті і можливостей продовження боротьби українськими військами проти Червоної армії за звільнення від неї території України. Нарешті третій торкався внутрішнього становища України – наявності організованого антибільшовицького руху, спираючись на який та координуючи із ним дії, військове і державне керівництво УНР сподівалося відновити свою владу в Україні.

У зв'язку із докорінними змінами, що настали після втрати території країни, її керівництво розробило нову концепцію боротьби. Як і раніше, головним засобом досягнення поставленої мети – відновлення УНР – розглядалася збройна боротьба. Вона повинна була поєднувати як військові акції повстанського руху на території України, так і підготовку регулярних частин, інтернованих на території Польщі та частини Румунії, до рейду в Україну. Посланням зусиль регулярних частин армії та повстанчих відділів передбачалося досягти успіху у звільненні території України від більшовицької влади. Підставою, що спонукала українське керівництво до такого висновку був аналіз ним ситуації, яка склалася в Україні наприкінці 1920 р.: слабкість радянського режиму, несприйняття його загальною населенням, а прелімінарний Ризький мирний договір від 18 жовтня 1920 р. здавався для нього нетривким і таким, що в недалекій перспективі закінчиться початком чергового польсько-радянського конфлікту, який Україна використає у своїх інтересах.

До того ж вже наприкінці 1920 року стало очевидно, що концепція орієнтації УНР на Польщу, як єдиного гаранта відновлення її незалежності, себе не виправдала. Остання була слабкою, щоб конкурувати на рівні з радянською Росією, до того ж в кінцевому рахунку будувала з нею свої відносини українським коштом. Тому спроба у перспективі створити у цій країні базу для підготовки звільнення України від більшовицької окупації для уряду УНР видавалася проблематичною. Однак у той час для нього, по суті, альтернативи не було.

Ключові слова: національне державотворення, військово-політична стратегія, антибільшовицька боротьба, Армія УНР, Україна.

Period of national state in Ukraine in the early twentieth century, particularly in 1917–1921, Since the independence of Ukraine is significant interest among scientists, political and public figures. Also there are analysed the peculiarities of military strategy of leaders UPR in order to continue antibolshevik fight after final loss the Ukrainian territory at the same time.

Key words: national state, analysed the peculiarities of military strategy, antibolshevik fight, Army UPR, Ukraine.

Background and problem statement. Period of national state in Ukraine in the early twentieth century, particularly in 1917–1921, cause a significant interest among scientists, political and public figures since the independence of Ukraine. The relevance of this problem is, of course, need of objective coverage of Ukraine's history for the education of the younger generation, for the cultivation of its military traditions among national liberation struggle of 1917–1921, especially today, when the issue of territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine is very acute .

The purpose of the research is to highlight the fighting regular UPR armies at autumn 1920 and features of military-political strategy guide UPR to continue anti-Bolshevik struggle in the early 20 th century.

The current state of problems development. An important source to study the topic is primarily archival documents stored in the State Historical Archives of Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv and Lviv. Except the archival documents is also important to the study of periodicals occupy the time and memories of participants.

The main material. Analyzing the military-political situation in Ukraine in autumn 1920, it should be noted that it conditioned the three most important factors. First – foreign-related government attempts UPR include Ukrainian question in the Polish-Soviet negotiations in Riga for recognition of the legitimacy of the Soviet Russia and the formal recognition of the independence of the UPR. The second factor is directly followed from the first and dealt with military-strategic situation UNR Army in the Polish-Soviet front and opportunities for Ukrainian troops continue the fight against the Red Army for the Liberation of it in Ukraine. Finally, the third is about the internal situation in Ukraine – the presence of organized antibolshevik movement, based on that, and coordinating them with action, military and political leadership of the UPR hoped to restore his power in Ukraine [1, p. 43].

Regarding the international aspect of the continuing struggle for the liberation of Ukraine, for UNR government began to take shape, it is clearly not in it favor. Campaign in 1920 convinced the Polish leadership that taking on impossible task cause the collapse of their own country. Already in the second half of July, Polish leaders were willing to start, against the Warsaw Pact of the UPR of 21 April, unilateral negotiations with the government of Soviet armistice.

On July 30 was the first meeting between the commanders of both sides, which, although it did not produce results, but still started the Polish-Soviet negotiations process. Despite the success of the Polish-Bolshevik forces on the front, in the autumn of 1920 Warsaw considered inappropriate to expose themselves to the risk of continuing the war with Soviet Russia, and therefore October 12 agreed to sign the lifting of the provisional Riga Peace Treaty, which entered into force on October 18, 1920. The worst for UNR government was that the Polish delegation openly trampled that they will not enter into any unilaterally “international conditions against Ukraine”, recognizing the “independence” of Soviet Ukraine [2, p. 107].

Signing the lifting of the provisional peace with Soviet Russia October 12 obliges Poland to break a military alliance with the UPR, which certainly led to inevitable defeat Ukrainian army at the front. After November 2nd Polish representative units were withdrawn from the area of deployment of Ukrainian troops. This event was formally the Polish side of the responsibility for further developments on the Ukrainian front piece. The withdrawal of Polish troops ended November 8 and Ukrainian parts were face to face with the Soviet troops, while continuing to fight for a month [3, s. 88]. Started last stage of its armed struggle, which lasted until November 21, 1920.

Following the lifting of the provisional exchange of instruments of ratification of the peace treaty between Russia and Poland Ukrainian leadership is not rejected further struggle. Most domestic and foreign researchers believe that the continuation of the war had no prospects. Many leaders of higher state of the UPR were set pessimistic. O.Kovalevskyy, who in 1920 served as Minister of Land Affairs, wrote

that during meetings in Kamenetz-Podolsk assumed inevitable disaster. There was a lack of weapons and ammunition. Senior military commanders also involved the time of the accident [4, s. 59].

Chief Commander of S.Petliura sought to establish the delivery of weapons from Romania and Germany. Negotiations on this issue and promised success was achieved prior consent. It was also agree to coordinate military operations with General Vranghel in August 1920. [5, s. 500].

Considering all these factors, the UNR Army Command decided to begin November 2 general offensive. Meanwhile, the situation at the front worsened. In early November, the 13th Soviet Army launched a general attack on the troops of General Vranghel.

For a discussion of the political and military situation on 7–8, November at Yalutushkov convened meeting with S. Petliura, members of the government and command of the army. The meeting discussed further fate State Center UPR and options transactions at the front. New counterattack was postpone to 11 November [6, s. 438]. Ukrainian command basic rate making sudden concentrated on impact. However, the chance was not use due to non-adherence privacy. November 9 streets Mogilev-Podolsky openly talked about the planned Ukrainian counterattack. The Soviet command also knew about it. It began its own counteroffensive on the day before Ukrainian – 10 November.

November 17, in the border village Frydryhivka held in Ukraine last meeting UNR government. Simon Petliura said that the situation at the front is catastrophic. On the same day to the Chief Ataman came rates representative of the Polish Army Command. He informed that the Ukrainian army would be interne, if the border with Poland will be cross. The above command received the right of free movement and residence on the territory of Poland. At the meeting, it was decide to move to the Polish territory. Offered as an option guerrilla warfare. Army and the Government of had to break into the enemy lines and continue to fight a guerrilla. However, this project was not support. Through the front got only a small detachment of cavalry colonel A. Doluda [7, s. 236].

November 19 UNR government went to Volochysk. There was a final decision to move the Polish border. November 20 civilians crossed the border state institutions. Also started crossing some Russian general Peremykin parts. November 21, from the Polish side was obtaine permission to cross border. The crossing took place between Volochysk and Ozhyhovtsi under heavy enemy fire. For its cover was allocate a separate division and horse cavalry regiment [6, s. 328]. In the afternoon, crossing over the army was finished. Thus, on the right bank Zbruch passed about 10 thousand officers and soldiers. All of them were sent to internment camps, Kalisz, Alexandrov, Wadowice, Stzhalkov. Government of civilian agencies located in Tarnów and Czestochowa. November 25 there came Simon Petliura [8, s. 308].

At the same time, General Command of Polish forces issued a secret order. According to him, all Ukrainian departments should be disarmed. The local Polish administration “should meet them with full commitment and politeness and remember that they are recent allies and brothers in arms” [9, s. 64].

The entire territory of Ukraine threatened loss of demoralization of the army. S.Petliura tried to prevent this. November 23, 1920, he issued an order, which forbade demobilization departments. They had to be concentrated “in general terms the objective of internment and the preparatory work for the return to Ukraine” [10, s. 152]. According to the Chief Ataman internment period should be used to reorganize the army and thorough preparation for the start of the new campaign.

Thus, the preservation of the organizational structure and efficiency of the army for a period of internment in Poland was one of the most important tasks of the leaders of the UPR. They actively sought ways out of this situation and developed new concepts continuation of armed struggle. Also been organizing the insurgency in Ukraine with the possibility of a regular army.

In autumn 1920, Ukrainian command concluded that spontaneous insurgent struggle rarely could achieve. You can only get concerted actions of the regular army. Another option – to provide the partisan struggle character regular armed force, centralized professional management, application techniques tactical art.

When organizing guerrilla insurgency-Ukraine, military leaders used the UPR theoretical developments on this issue. In particular the higher of Russian officers: M.Holitsyn “About guerrilla action on a large scale, given in the right system and applied on the actions of our army in general and in particular Russian”, F. Hershelman “Guerrilla War”, V.Klebovskuy “Guerrilla warfare. Leadership experience “[11, s. 17, 19, 23]. Note that the top management carefully matched-partisan organization

insurgency in Ukraine. After reliance on guerrilla-insurgency in Ukraine was the most appropriate. As history shows, in some cases guerrilla war can play a greater role than the actions of regular armies. Its main task – organized armed struggle for the liberation of Ukraine population of the country from the Bolshevik occupation. It was in this situation was the end of UPR 1920 It has developed a number of factors. Some of them have contributed to the deployment of the insurgency. These include: the abundance of organized rebel troops who knew thorns hostilities; sympathetic attitude of the population to rebel; poorly equipped enemy lines and its great length; the presence of guerrilla groups led military specialists; enough weapons to people that remained from the time of previous wars; weakness Bolshevik administrative staff in the field.

Adverse factors include – the collapse of the state apparatus UNR; moving abroad guidance armed struggle; Ukrainian parts stay regular army outside Ukraine; their internment and disarmament; Financial devastation large part of Ukraine as a result of past military operations; presence in the country a large number of occupation troops and an extensive grid of repressive organs.

The defeat of UNR troops in autumn 1920 had a major demoralizing effect on the Ukrainian population. During 1918–1920 majority of those who spoke with weapons against the Bolshevik regime focused on rebel groups. However, not all of which supported the ideology of the government of the UPR. Although the rebel movement for the restoration of the UPR was very organized and widespread.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to establish the number of participants and the rebel guerrilla movement. Not all information about the secret formation were completed. Not all of them were recorded in Soviet sources also not received all the information to the government of the UPR. In addition, the number of rebel groups and guerrilla groups constantly fluctuated. The reasons for this were: changes in public attitudes to the policy of the Soviet government; certain tactical and organizational characteristics of units; their territorial movement; number of Red Army forces; number of military clashes and casualties. It is knew only to increase the number of Bolshevik forces. Under rare reports, including the report in chief Bolshevik forces in Ukraine M. Frunze at the First National Congress of poor peasants, in October 1920 in Ukraine there were more than 50 groups of guerrillas, 40 000 people total. [12, p. 92].

In January – early February 1921 many guerrilla forces and rebel groups have moved to neighbouring countries. First, it was Poland and Romania. The main reason for strengthening the part of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine mass executions, repression, persecution rebels, etc. [13, ark.17]. However, resistance to the Bolshevik regime did not go away. According to Soviet sources, a new rise of the resistance movement observed in early 1921 in Kyiv region only when there were about 100 units. According to official data, in late 1920 – at the beginning of 1921 only major rebel groups there were more than 100 thousand soldiers [14, s. 209]. The Soviet authorities made significant efforts to eliminate the risk of deploying uprising in Ukraine.

Analysing deployment of partisan insurgency in Ukraine after the transition regular Ukrainian army at r. Zbruch can draw some conclusions. The most important – UNR leadership decided to change the concept of continuing further struggle. The decision to create a single governing body. Therefore, in December 1920 was create Department of rebel organizations of five people. Lt. V.Zeyehorsh headed it. [15, spr. 165, ark. 223]. The main tasks of the department began gathering information on the number of guerrilla forces and rebel groups; their combat effectiveness; accommodation; agility; organization of their military operations. At the beginning of 1921 was create the Supreme Military Council. The main task of the Council – coordination between the command and the army. Lieutenant-general UNR Army M.Yunakov led it. In the five permanent members of the February 16, 1921, it included representatives of the army general-cornet O. Udovychenko and Yu. Tyutyunnyk [16, spr. 15, ark. 23].

To coordinate the work and the future of Ukrainian armed uprising in January 1921, it was decide to create a special body. At Home, Team UNR Army started its operations on its creation. At the end of the month in Tarnów S.Petliura gathered meeting with commanders of the army of the UPR. It was decide to create a Ukrainian-guerrilla rebel headquarters. The main task was to coordinate the Staff rebel struggle in Ukraine with the activities of the government in exile UNR [15, spr. 7, ark. 320]. Organization Staff was instructed Commander of the Fourth Division of the Kiev-General cornet Yu.Tyutyunnyk.

Conclusion. Termination struggle regular units UNR Army led to the forced emigration of the Ukrainian government in Poland. Military defeat was seen as a temporary leadership of UNR break in the war against Bolshevik Russia. The UPR government planned to fight for the independence of Ukraine to the end.

Due to the loss of territory management UPR has developed a new concept of struggle. The main means of achieving this goal – considered armed struggle. It was to combine military action insurgency in Ukraine and prepare regular troops to raid in Ukraine. In this way, planned to succeed in the liberation of Ukraine from the Bolshevik government. This is due to review the situation in Ukraine in the early 20's – the weakness of the Soviet regime; rejection of its population; hope of fragility lifting of the provisional Riga Peace Treaty of October 18, 1920; hopes for another Polish-Soviet conflict that Ukraine can use to their advantage [17, p. 78].

However, it became apparent that the concept of targeting the UPR Poland has not justified. The latter was much weaker against Soviet Russia. Poland could not compete with Russia and with it built its relationship Ukrainian expense. Why did not guarantee the restoration of independence of Ukraine. So try to create in the country a base for the liberation of Ukraine from the Bolshevik occupation UNR government published problematic. However, while the Ukrainian government had no alternative.

1. Чорна книга України: зб. док., арх. матер., листів, доповідей, статей, досліджень, есе / упор. Ф. Зубанич. – К., 1998. 2. Стахів М. Третя Советська республіка в Україні: нариси з історії третьої воєнної інвазії Советської Росії в Україну і розвиток окупаційної системи в часі листопад 1919 – листопад 1924. – Нью-Йорк, 1968. 3. Stepien S. Symon Petlura – źyciej działalność // *Warszawskie zeszyty ukraińoznawcze*. – № 3. – Warszawa, 1996. 4. Ковалевський О. На вулкані. Публіцистичні статті. – Київ. – Тарнів, 1922. 5. Історія Української РСР у 8-ми т., 10-ти кн. – Т. 6. – К., 1977. 6. Сім'янець В. Роки козакування (1917–1923). Спогади. – Філадельфія, 1976. 7. Bruski J. J. Petlurowcy. *Centrum Państwowe Ukrainńskiej Republiki Ludowej na wychodźstwie (1919–1924)*. – Kraków, 2000. 8. Grunberg K., Sprengel B. *Trudne sąsiedztwo (Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w X–XX wieku)*. – Warszawa, 2005. 9. Гудь Б., Голубко В. Нелегка дорога до порозуміння. До питання генези українсько-польського військово-політичного співробітництва 1917–1921 рр. – Львів, 1997. 10. Срібняк І. Симон Петлюра – на чолі держави та війська // *Симон Петлюра та Українська національна революція*. – К., 1995. 11. Архієрейський Д., Ченцов В. Антирадянська націоналістична опозиція в УСРР в 20-ті рр.: погляд на проблему скрізь архівні джерела // *З архівів ВУЧК–ГПУ–НКВД–КГБ*. – № 2–4. – К., 2000. 12. Голубко В. Питання військової доктрини УНР у практичній діяльності та теоретичній спадщині С. Петлюри // *Ефективність державного управління: зб. наук. пр.* – Вип. 1–2. – Львів, 2002. 13. Центральний державний історичний архів у Львові. Ф. ВNW (Партизансько-Повстанський штаб), м/ф 68863. 14. Кравченко Б. Соціальні зміни і національна свідомість в Україні ХХ ст. – К., 1997. 15. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (далі ЦДАВОВУ). Ф. 1078 (Головна управа Генерального Штабу Армії УНР), оп. 2. 16. ЦДАВОВУ. Ф. 3361 (Всеукраїнська комісія у боротьбі з контрреволюцією і злочинством за посадою), оп.1. 17. Сальський В. Головні підстави творення Армії УНР в минулому і майбутньому // *Табір*. – 1927. – Кн. 4.