## Models of Argumentation in Eighteen Century Cambridge Platonism (the Case of Ralph Cudworth)

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Abstract – The paper focuses on the influence of some argumentation models upon the development of the epistemological concepts of Ralph Cudworth, an XVII-th century Cambridge Platonist.

Key words – models of argumentation, Cambridge Platonism, Ralph Cudworth, the nature of knowledge, philosophia perennis.

#### I. Introduction

As a h istorical and ph ilosophical ph enomenon Cambridge Platonism is placed between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Although the seventeenth century is a period of Early Modern Philosophy, Cambridge (Neo)Platonists cannot be called neither empiricists nor rationalists.

What di stinguished C ambridge Pl atonism from t he other s chools of Modern Phi losophy was t heir s pecific view of the central phi losophical problems and the arguments they used for the as sertion of their own position.

For example, let u s take the works of one of the main representatives of C ambridge Pl atonism — R alph Cudworth. In his key work *«The True Intellectual System of the Universe»* he made a natte mpt to harmonically combine modern science and centuries-old experience of Christian ph ilosophy, which the author interpreted through the traditional concepts of P latonism and Neoplatonism.

The true value of the p hilosophical heritage of Ralph Cudworth was appreciated on ly in the twentieth century. Cudworth is said to be "the real founder of British Idealism," [1] "the on ly philosopher of the Cambridge group" [2] and "the most tough-minded and lucid among the Cambridge Platonists." [3].

# II. Key elements of Cudworth` argumentation

In sh ort, the p hilosopher's hares n either the views of modern philosophers that the truth must be sought only in the present or the future, nor their belief in the possibility of progress in philosophy. C udworth defended the continuity of the tradition. As a true Platonist he believed in the existence of *philosophia perennis* or etern all philosophy which has all ways been maintained in its fundamental traits.

To achieve its g oal, Cu dworth offers the f ollowing model of argumentation: to do a critical analysis of all the ancient philosophy and choose not only the most suitable in t erms of et ernal a nd t rue on e, bu t al so di scard

unnecessary and harmful, leading to its degradation and neglect. Using this strategy, Cudworth not only show the continuity of the philosophical tradition, but also criticizes two main e nemies of religious thought of the XVI I century— at heism and materialism. For instance, when he writes about the nature of knowledge and the way in which the mind gains the ability of knowledge, he refers not to the direct analysis of the contents of consciousness, as did L ocke or Hum e, but allows himself to formulate certain metaphysical prejudices, which main objective is to prove the relation between the divine and the human mind.

Key elements of Cudworth' argumentation:

- 1. The reference to the authority of the Bible.
- T he authority of an cient philosophers, in particular
  Plato and Plotinus.

Obviously, the philosopher relies on his own logical presuppositions, but he is certain that those two elements are enough to build a foundation for everything else.

There is nos urprise that he uses the Bible as a nauthority. For Cu dworth, the Bible embodies all the fullness of Christian philosophy. So there is noneed in other sources—that is why he completely ignores the works of both the Church fathers and the medieval thinkers. Secondly, authority of the Bible is commensurate to authority of ancient philosophers. There is found in Cu dworth' works this specific feature of Renaissance philosophical thought when he refers to Plato who is as authoritative as the Scriptures themselves.

# III. Epistemological Conception of Ralph Cudworth

We as sume, in such a model there are certain explicit flaws. P rimarely, a forced s electivity of s ources. Especially of those that represent the opposite viewpoints. Cudworth selects only those fragments in the writings of Plato, Plotinus and Ia mblichus t hat reinf orce h is o wn position, and carefully avoids places that could cause him trouble.

The way in which Cudworth uses his arguments clearly indicates on his vision of the nature of knowledge. The latter, in his opinion, is b asically impossible unless there is something eternal that would provide the preconditions for existence of all things. The philosopher belie ves that the world is eter nal, and it p rovides the immutability of truth and indicates a continuity of knowledge. These considerations lead homeon important that the possibility of human knowledge itself could be caused only by one antecedent—the existence of God [4].

It is tr ue t hat while r eading C udworth it b ecomes immediately evident that the intention of his philosophy is primarily t heological. I n f act, he b elieved th at "philosophy should h ave a r eligious f oundation." [5] From such passages of C udworth as "there is a scale of being, with God at the head and at the foot in animate matter [4] or "the divine will and omnipotence itself hath no imperium upon the divine understanding: for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all" [4] we can easily predict what kind of epistemology is to

be ex pected from t he a uthor. P assmore seems to have aptly re marked about traditional theories of knowledge saying that they do not arise out of a direct examination of the content of consciousness but rather appear as a consequence of metaphysical presuppositions [6].

In Cudworth's philosophy there are t wo kinds of such presuppositions. The first one says that there is a natural distinction bet ween g ood and ev il. It does n ot depen d upon human or divine legislation but rather inherent in the realm of being its elf. The second presupposition underlines that since there is a fundamental gap between reality and appearance there must be a crucial difference between man's cognitive faculties. Because Cudworth's epistemological argument is chiefly used to introduce an ontology [7] some of its specific features need to be reminded more precisely.

Cudworth p ays a g reat d eal o f atten tion to differentiating the nature of reason and that of sensation. The in tention of es tablishing this basic difference is to demonstrate that sensation can not be knowledge and thus to prov e th e es sential on tological diff erence bet ween these two kinds of cognition. According to Cudworth, in real k nowledge knower and k nown must be iden tical, whereas in sensation the senser and the sensed are always quite di stinct. Consequently, h e a sserts t hat percept ion also must be sharply distinguished from knowledge, since knowledge is o f propos itions, an d perception is knowledge of is olated sensation. So C udworth concludes that bot h percept ion a nd kn owledge are two di stinct processes, and thus knowledge is regarded only as selfknowledge.

On these g rounds, C udworth s tresses the connection between h is t heory of kn owledge and t hat propos ed by Plato in his Theatetus. As we remember, in this dialogue Socrates is presented as supporting the argument that real knowledge starts with the analyses of judgements, not of sensations, and the former necessarily involve relations. Since t he relations are n ever perceiv ed b y s enses, knowledge and perception can not be identical. Cudworth takes this doctrine as his point of departure and attempts to develop a detailed theory of the ideas and forms of their relationships. It is true that his list of concepts is more e xtensive t han t hat elaborated by Socrates . However, it can not be said that Cudworth gives us any careful deduction or ex act classification of the concepts. He only suggests three classes into which ideas may be divided, na mely, i deas r egarding t he na ture of t hinking beings, and here Cu dworth i ncludes all i deals of truth, beauty, a nd g oodness; i deas con sidering t he ultimate reality of corporeal bein gs; an d, finally, ideas o f relationships among corporeal beings.

Characteristically, it is the is fact of k inship b etween human and divine knowledge that Cud worth constantly emphasises. For he imparticipation in the divine knowledge means that, while there is a vast difference in degree between man's knowledge and that of God, man's knowledge is like His in kind. B riefly, in a world of a constant change where sensations cannot be a reliable

source of knowledge there is still possible a clearness of the ideas in man's thinking. These are true and valid source of k nowledge because they are "contained in some one active and vital principle." [8] Arguing for all these principles Cu dworth is quite certain that he has found the firm ground standing on which he can move the world

This "o ne active and vital principle" Cu dworth often makes reference to which he is certain lies at the bottom of all the in telligible world is nothing else but God. Cudworth depicts Him as "...the first original Knowledge or Mind, from whence all other knowledge and minds are derived, being that of a nabsolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending... the ideas of all possible things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary and immutable truths." Sohe is convinced that the very nature of man's knowledge and understanding "proves the existence of God." [8].

#### Conclusion

Thus, we can easily distinguish the following features of Ralp h C udworth' ar gumentation: a) eq uivalent authority of the Bi ble and the ancient philosophers; b) appeal to the necessary existence of the divine and eternal as a precondition of existence of entity and possibility to cognize it; and c) selective attitude to the sources from which the thinker chooses those which better demonstrate the need in the existence of God and his role in this world and bring continuity to the philosophical tradition.

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