

Мова, свідомість та парадигма суб'єктивності у концепції

Райла

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Свідомість є однією з головних проблем філософських дискусій. В індійській та західній думці навколо цього поняття зосереджується неабияка увага. У західній традиції Декарт запровадив поняття дуалізму душі та тіла. Ця декартова дихотомія мала вплив на багатьох західних мислителів аж до ХХ століття, коли дуалізм Декарта був відкинтий. Причиною відмови від дуалізму стала публікація знаменитої наукової праці оксфордського філософа Гілберта Райла під назвою «Поняття свідомості» близько шістдесяти років тому, в якій Райл зазначає, що Декарт зробив «категоріальну помилку». Він критикує картезіанський дуалізм як догмат «Примари в машині», тому що в дуалізмі одне є матеріальним, а інше – нематеріальним. Існує загальна тенденція розглядати роботи Райла як «біхевіористські», але насправді це не так. Відоме вивільнення свідомості та інтроспекції не становить надбання громадськості. Згадана книга Райла має багато пережитків біхевіоризму, але сам Райл стверджує: «У цій книзі я дуже мало писав про науку психології. Це упущення може здаватися дуже помилковим, адже книгу можна було б прийняти за твір не про наукову, а про філософську психологію». Отже, не варто вважати Райла біхевіористом. За словами А. Дж. Ейера, для того, щоб біхевіористська програма досягла успіху, необхідно показати, що ментальну розмову можна перефразувати таким чином, що у ній не залишиться будь-яких посилань на внутрішнє життя. Однак, багато вчених висловили серйозні заперечення проти поняття свідомості Райла і навряд чи той, хто сьогодні досліджує філософію свідомості, серйозно віднесеться до його поняття. У своїй відомій книзі Райл спробував пояснити філософську проблему шляхом логічного аналізу повсякденної мови. Хоча, про це дуже важко говорити, спираючись на повсякденну мову. За словами Райла, повсякденна мова повинна включати в себе захист програми формалізації. Таким чином, у цій статті ми підняли деякі питання та проблеми, пов'язані із зазначеним вище. Ця стаття є спробою показати, що ніхто не може розкрити себе через природну мову.

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Language, Mind and Paradigm of Subjectivity in Ryle's Framework

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*Dualism came to be repudiated as a result of a landmark treatise by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle entitled *The Concept of Mind*, some sixty years ago, in which Ryle accorded that Descartes committed 'category mistake'. He critiqued Cartesian dualism as the dogma of 'the Ghost in the Machine' because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial. But many scholars have raised serious objections to Ryle's concept of mind and hardly anyone working in philosophy of mind today takes seriously Ryle's concept. In his celebrated book Ryle has tried to elucidate to philosophical problem through logical analysis of ordinary language. However, it is very difficult to talk about the self on the basis of ordinary language. According to Ryle ordinary language ought to involve championing the programme of formalisation. So in this paper we have raised some concerns and problems for these claims. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate that one cannot disclose the self through natural language/*

Keywords: Mind, Ryle, Self, Language, Subjectivity

I. Introduction

Mind is one of the central problems of philosophical controversy, and much of the crucial discussion in Indian and western thought clusters round this cardinal notion. In western tradition, Descartes established the dualism of body and mind. This Cartesian dichotomy influenced the minds of many western thinkers until the twentieth century, during which Descartes' dualism was rejected. This dualism came to be repudiated as a result of a landmark treatise by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle entitled *The Concept of Mind*, some sixty years ago, in which Ryle accorded that Descartes committed 'category mistake'.

He critiqued Cartesian dualism as the dogma of 'the Ghost in the Machine' because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial. But many scholars have raised serious objections to Ryle's concept of mind and hardly anyone working in philosophy of mind today takes seriously Ryle's concept. In his celebrated book Ryle has tried to elucidate to philosophical problem through logical analysis of ordinary language. However, it is very difficult to talk about the self on the basis of ordinary language. According to Ryle ordinary language ought to involve championing the programme of formalisation. So in this paper we have raised some concerns and problems for these claims. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate that one cannot disclose the self through natural language.

II. Dualism

At the outset itself let us have a look at the *leitmotiv* in the *magnum opus* of Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*. The

general trend of Ryle's work is undoubtedly be stigmatized as 'behaviourist' and it is not so indeed. The reputed deliverances of consciousness and introspection are not publicly. This book of Ryle has much of the vestiges of behaviourism, yet Ryle himself states:

"In the course of this book I have said very little about the science of psychology. This omission will have appeared particularly perverse, since the entire book could properly be described as an essay, not indeed in scientific but in philosophical psychology."

So, one should not consider Ryle as a behaviorist. According to A. J. Ayer, for a behaviourist programme to succeed, it has to be shown that mental talk can be reformulated in such a way as to eliminate any reference to an inner life. But *The Concept of Mind* abounds with such references. For example Ryle writes in his book, "its exercises can be overt or covert, deeds performed or deeds imagined, words spoken aloud or words heard in one's head, pictures painted on canvas or pictures in the mind's eye. Or they can be amalgamations of the two." Ryle concedes the existence of an inner mental life.

Ryle is not at all in agreement with the Cartesian dualism, and so he in his book mainly brings to light and critiques the committing of the logical error of mixing up one category (or logical type of concept) with another. Such an error he called a *category-mistake*. For support of his concept Ryle has examined the concept through *ordinary language* and attacked from many flank upon the *category-mistake* which underlies the dogma of the *ghost in the machine*. In order to fathom the arguments of Ryle we take up the main contention of his language analysis by doing which we cognize the nuances of his *category mistake* and *concept of mind*.

Let us explicate a little about the "category mistake" which Ryle is speaking of. In his *The Concept of Mind* Ryle has discarded the dogma of mind-body dualism and argued that in 'mind and body' conception there are two different kinds of existence or status. What exists or happens may have the status of physical existence, or it may have the status of mental subsistence. Somewhat as the faces of coins are either heads or tails, or somewhat either male or female, so it is supposed, some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing. It is a necessary feature of what has physical existence that it is in space and time; it is a necessary feature of what has mental existence that it is in time but not in space. "His body and his mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of the body his mind may continue to exist and function".

According to official doctrine human bodies exists in the space and any one can observe it, but mind is subject to mechanical laws. It means one cannot take cognizance of the states and processes of other mind. Consequently, it is believed that there are two different kind of world. One is physical world or which is witnessable and other is mental world or private. Somewhat as the faces of coins are either heads or tails. It is supposed that some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing. Ryle says that Descartes has committed special kind of

mistake, which is category mistake. 'It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another'. He presents dualism as the dogma of the *Ghost in the Machine* because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial.

Ryle argues against the dualism and says that the problem is in this doctrine that one may have great or small uncertainties about concurrent and adjacent episodes in the physical world, but he can have none about at least part of what is momentarily occupying his mind. Again, the mind which is yards or miles out side a person's skin, can generate mental responses inside his skull, or how decisions framed inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities. The real transactions between the episodes of the private history and those of the public history remain mysterious. If one accepts this official doctrine then one is in a position to take a look at what is passing in his mind. Again one cannot direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another. Official doctrine has no good reason to believe in this dualism.

Let us recall once again what Ryle labels Descartes' error as a 'category mistake', which is a malfunction of reasoning when predicate is applied to something logically inappropriate. His three classical examples in this regard are considering or thinking that a *university* is a thing other than its colleges, or an *army* division is not just a group of soldiers, or *team spirit* is something more than just the behaviour of a sports team. Thus, Ryle critiqued Descartes' position of body-mind dualism as if having misconceived facts. Descartes imagined, Ryle opines, that there is a 'ghost' inside us which works a merely mechanical body. Descartes did not take hold of fact that the words like 'mind' and 'consciousness' label or brand groups of behavior, and not actual things.

III The Conception of Mind

We, now, will look at the facets of 'language, mind and the paradigm of subjectivity' in Ryle's scheme of understanding in relation to his critique of Descartes', namely, Ryle's notion of 'category mistake'. As we have stated above, Ryle rejects the Cartesian dualism and states that one should not hold that mind and body belong to the same kind of category. He argues that the workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body. As Ryle writes, for example, 'a foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific department and administrative office. He then asks but where is the university?' It has then to be explained to him that university is just way in which all that he has already seen is organized. Ryle writes:

The same mistake would be made by a child witnessing the march-past of a division, who having had pointed out to him such and such battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc. asked when the division was going to appear. He would be supposing that a division was counterpart to the

units already seen, partly similar to them and partly unlike them. He would be shown his mistake by being told that in watching the battalions, batteries and squadrons marching past he had been watching the division marching past. The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division.

Likewise, one cannot figure out the mind like sense organ or matter because mind is just way to express all the activity of the body. Mind represents the entire function of the body and this is the Ryle's concept of mind. He has pointed out that category-mistakes are made by those people who are perfectly skilled to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong. For example, a student of politics has learned the main differences between constitutions of different country and has learned also the differences and connections between the cabinet, parliament, the various ministries, the judicature and the Church of England. But he is still confused about the connections between the Church of England, the home office and the British Constitution. For while the church and the home office are institutions, the British constitution is not another institution in the same sense of that noun, so inter-institutional relations which can be asserted or denied to hold between either of them and the British constitution. The British Constitution is not a term of the same logical type as the home office and the Church of England. However, as Ryle wishes to argue, there is no such ghostlike mind that controls the body as machine that is said, forms the invisible, immaterial ego, which, knowing itself as 'I' remains the same amidst all that is changeable. It is the recipient of knowledge through the five gateways of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. It is the agent that is active in the movements of the various motor organs.

In Ryle's concept of mind, when one say that there is no self that is like the lord not only of the body, then what am I? Some time the word 'I' represent our experience. For instance I am hungry; I am not feeling well etc. But this explanation is not acceptable and this enigma has continued to perplex theorist. 'Even Hume confesses that, when he has tried to sketch all the items of his experience, he has found nothing there to answer to the word 'I', and yet he is not satisfied that there does not remain something more and something important, without which his sketch fails to describe his experience'. So when we use 'I' then it indicates our motion. In same way Ryle says that 'when a person utters an 'I' sentence, his statement of it may be part of a higher order act, namely one, perhaps, of self-reporting, self-exhortation, or self-commiseration and this performance itself is not dealt with in the operation which it itself is. In this regard, Ryle writes,

"There is nothing mysterious of occult about the range of higher order acts and attitudes,

which are apt to be inadequately covered by the umbrella-title 'self-consciousness'. They are the same in kind as the higher order acts and attitudes exhibited in the dealings of people with one another. Indeed the former are only a special application of the latter and are learned first from them. If I perform the third order operation of commenting on a second order act of laughing at myself for a piece of manual awkwardness, I shall indeed use the first personal pronoun in two different ways."

Ryle argues and advises that one should not take 'mind' different from the body. Ryle has presented an account concerning the way they have been led up the garden path by philosophers who have set them unanswerable problems to solve, which need never have arisen if the philosophers in question had only kept their feet on the ground and disciplined their language. Ryle tries to do justice to the difference, tries to show how unlike the two perplexities are; yet at the end of the day, one is compelled to say that for him the resemblance matters more than the difference. He would like to dissolve the whole plethora of anxieties that issue from this sense of duality in human existence by a skillful and sustained use of the theory of logical types. Ryle has tried in his monumental work, which we are referring to, to elucidate to philosophical problem through logical investigation of ordinary language.

IV. Ryle and Language

Though briefly mentioned, we have tried to understand the conception of mind as Ryle wanted to present in his framework of philosophical analysis. Now let us make a critique of Ryle's thesis of 'mind'. In his *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle does not keep himself busy in inquiring on making metaphysical entity and metaphysics as such. So through the experience he has discussed mind-body problem. According to Ryle through expression one can talk about the inner self. For instance he writes, "We should consider some differences between such avowals as 'I feel a tickle' and 'I feel ill'. If a person feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he feels it. But he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may not feel ill." Again he writes: "People often speak in this way; they say, 'I was conscious that the furniture had been rearranged', or, 'I was conscious that he was less friendly than usual'. In such contexts the word 'conscious' is used instead of words like 'found out', 'realized', and 'discovered' to indicate a certain noteworthy nebulosness and consequent inarticulateness of the apprehension."

So Ryle has analyzed the expression which is experienced in day to day life. He admits that consideration of experience is philosophically profitable. But it is easy to see that discussing the use of something is quite different from discussing the use of the method. For example a person who has learned how to whistle tunes may not find the whistling of tunes at all useful or even pleasant to others or to himself. He manages, or

sometimes mismanages his lips, tongue and breath; and, more indirectly, manages or mismanages the notes he produces. He has got the trick of it; he can show us and perhaps even tell us how the trick is performed. But it is a useless trick. The question 'how do you see breath or lips in whistling?' has positive and complicated answer. The question 'what is the use, or the utility of whistling?' has a negative and simple one. The former is a request for the details of a technique; the latter is not. He argues that one can use the language for revealing the truth about inner self if he has enough knowledge about the language. In this critiquing of ours, let us first take his concept of *self* or *I*, and subsequently the 'ordinary language' will be considered.

It is well known that the word 'I' is methodically ambiguous. For example, when I say that 'I' stands for the person that I am, it also stands for my ego or as subject. Here Ryle's response of this objection is "there is nothing mysterious or occult about the range of higher order acts and attitudes, which are apt to be inadequately covered by the umbrella-title 'self-consciousness'". But, as far as we are concerned, this is not acceptable because every time the word 'I' does not stand for our activity. According to J. N. Mohanty there is no standard way of distinguishing between *ego*, *I as subject* and *self*. Mohanty writes in this connection,

"The idea of the ego, as I shall use it here, is the idea of my interior mental life in its solitude, cut off from my involvement in the world and society. It presupposes putting into effect what Husserl called the *epoche*- all my experiences with their built-in intentionalities remain as they are, save and except the natural, taking-for-granted that I along with my experiences am a part of the world. Suspending this belief in the world, I find myself to be an ongoing temporal flow of experiences....."

So, one can not explain *self* as a name of 'higher activity'. My body is not given to me as a thing like pen and paper. Merleau Ponty argues the bodily movement itself is intentional. It is not unexpected that rarely do we recognize photographs of our hands and feet as ours. When we see them as things which we confront, rather than as what we are, they undergo a fundamental change of significance. So there is a lot of discussion on the dualism. For getting rid of Cartesian dualism one should not bring it down to physicalism because it does not seem logically tenable. One way or other, one is afraid; Ryle's position is akin to it.

We would like to raise one more problem regarding 'ordinary language.' It is well known that we use the language to express our feeling or experience. But here one can raise a question whether transparency is in our language or not, because transparency is supposed to be a way of gaining knowledge about one's attitudes. Usually

we can make knowledgeable judgments about a state of mind by answering a question about its content. Ryle has used this method frequently in his *The Concept of Mind* to reveal the truth about the self or inner life. When one wants to know about the inner self he asks many questions to himself and tries to gain something about inner life. The answer can be in different way like in affirmative or negative. Because, one gets the answer to the question, but again he asks question. So in this way one tries to know his own inner life. Now our point is that sometimes one can get answer to this process but transparency of his language will be there and in that condition one cannot gain correct knowledge about his inner life. For example suppose if someone has some pre-idea about his question, in such a condition that idea will give different shape to different question. So it is very difficult to say in language without any vagueness. Sometimes one feel something but he keeps this feeling in well known category because he does not know or, we can say, he does not have any choice due to limitation of language.

V. Conclusion

However, we have to acknowledge and appreciate that Gilbert Ryle's celebrated volume *The Concept of Mind* is a brilliant attack of Cartesian dualism. But in his later paper "Ordinary Language", Ryle advocated that one should consider adequate expression/language for philosophical use and communication. We submit that ordinary language is good enough to convey our feelings but for revealing the truth about inner self, it is inadequate. By this we mean that there is some limitation in/of the language we employ in our day to day life, which has its relatedness in common parlance. Conversely, with it one cannot sufficiently talk about the inner life.

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