Роль природних ресурсів, стратегічних активів та прав людини у розподілі іноземної економічної допомоги США

Наомі Мішель МакМіллен

Кафедра політичних наук, Центр з питань американської та державної політики, Вашингтонський університет, США, 101 район Gowen Hall, а/с 353530, Сієтл, Вашингтон 98195-3530,
E-mail: naomi_mcmillen@comcast.net

Сполучені Штати – це основний учасник більшості міжнародних організацій з питань прав людини і постійний член Ради Безпеки ООН. По суті, важливо, щоб міжнародна політика США з питань прав людини слугувала прикладом для інших країн, які б прийняли і наслідували її. Напротивагу, історія показує, що своєю іноземною допомогою США продовжує підтримувати порушників прав людини, незважаючи на те, що закони та законодавчі акти забороняють таку практику.

Спробую відповісти на питання: чому міжнародна політика США з питань прав людини до одних країн більш поблажлива, ніж до інших? Зокрема, мене цікавить питання: чи політика США з питань прав людини поблажлива по відношенню до країн (1) багатих на природні ресурси і (2) з високими страгтегічними цінностями. Для розуміння питання «поблажливості політики США з питань прав людини», за мірило я приняла двосторонню іноземну підтримку США: законодавство США забороняє розподіл іноземної допомоги між країнами, які «злісно порушують» права своїх громадян.

Я вважаю, що політика США з питань прав людини буде поблажливішою (тобто США виділятиме більше допомоги) по відношенню до країн, багатих на природні ресурси та стратегічні активи, оскільки питання економіки і безпеки мають величезне значення для захисту прав іноземних осіб.

У цьому дослідженні використовуються дані, зібрані у міжнародних урядових і національних організаціях протягом 29 років (1980-2009) у 177 країнах. Свою гіпотезу я перевіряю, використовуючи чотири моделі регресії і доходжу висновку, що політика США з питань прав людини є трохи більш поблажливою до країн, багатих на енергетичні ресурси. Я також вважаю, що державні дані про захист прав людини мало впливає на те, скільки іноземної допомоги країна отримує від США. Скидається на те, що політика США мотивується не зобов'язаннями захищати права людини, а зовсім іншими чинниками.

The Role of Natural Resources, Strategic Assets, and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Allocation

Naomi Michelle McMillen

Political Science Department, Center for American Politics and Public Policy, University of Washington, USA, 101 Gowen Hall, P.O. Box 353530, Seattle, WA 98195-3530,
E-mail: naomi_mcmillen@comcast.net

Abstract - Why is U.S. human rights policy more lenient toward some countries than others? Employing data from 29 years (1980-2009) across 177 countries in four regression models, I find that the U.S. gives slightly more aid to countries rich in energy resources. I also find that the human rights record of a State has little influence on how much U.S. foreign aid it receives.

I. Introduction

Most Americans would generally agree that promoting international human rights is an important U.S. foreign policy objective. Debate over how to reconcile strategic, commercial, and economic concerns with the professed obligation to enforce human rights, however, still plagues American politics and society. Despite U.S. assertions that promoting human rights is in its "national interest", many claim that the United States subverts human rights to other, more self-interested concerns [1]. A robust literature exists examining the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance allocation and human rights, but little research examines the role of individual factors in shaping U.S. human rights policy; available research is inconclusive and lacks in methodological rigor. I seek to fill the gap in the literature by examining the specific role of natural resources and strategic assets in U.S. international human rights policy.

I contend that although the U.S. considers human rights an important foreign policy factor, it is more concerned with maintaining power and prestige vis-à-vis natural resources and strategic assets and is unlikely to sacrifice them in the name of the international human rights regime. To contextualize my study, I include background information on the possible goals of U.S. human rights policy and foreign assistance as well as prior studies in the field. As my dependent variable and indicator of U.S. human rights policy, I employ a measure of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance. I also employ a variety of independent and control variables to further represent to perceived relationship between natural resources, strategic assets, human rights, and U.S. foreign aid allocation. I use four regression models—containing data across 29 years and 177 countries—to test my hypotheses and make conclusions.

II. Theoretical Background and Prior Research

Theories regarding the goals or objectives of U.S. human rights policy and foreign aid allocation can be roughly divided into two groups: the neo-realist explanation and the neo-liberal explanation.

Neo-realists argue that States use foreign policy instruments—such as human rights and foreign assistance—to further security, economic, and commercial objectives. During the Cold War, some scholars (Sengupta, 2002) have suggested that a large portion of U.S. foreign assistance allocation was based on "political factors and security alliances" [2]. David Cingranelli and David Pasquarello (1985) find that the level of U.S. foreign aid does not vary with the human rights practice of a state [3]. Neo-realist theory suggests that the U.S. gives more aid to—and its human rights policy more lenient toward—allies and strategic partners.

Neo-liberals, on the other hand, believe that it is in the U.S.'s best interest to uphold human rights because it "establishes a system of world order" and "furthers [the] peaceful evolutionary democratization of States" [4]. The neo-liberal theory is the official position of the United States government. Burton A. Abrams and Kenneth Lewis (1993) find that the U.S. considers economic need, human rights, as well as other factors when allocating aid [5]. A study by Claire Apodaca and Michael Stohl (1999) addresses the same issues and also finds that human rights does determine what countries are given aid and how much [6]. Neo-liberal theory suggests that the U.S. gives more aid to the countries with the best human rights practices.

III. My Contribution

First, and most importantly, my research contributes to the body of literature on U.S. human rights policy by addressing the specific role of natural resources and strategic assets in shaping that policy. Most prior studies have focused on the relationship between human rights and foreign assistance policy, but have come to vague conclusions. A fraction of studies indicate that the U.S. considers human rights when allocating aid but the vast majority conclude the opposite. I seek to develop a more definitive answer by hypothesizing the factors that *do* determine U.S. human rights policy. In this regard, my study is unique.

Second, my research project contributes to the body of literature on U.S. human rights policy because my design seeks to correct some of the methodological errors encountered by prior studies. I hope that in doing so, my results will be more legitimate than other research endeavours. One major problem with prior studies is the lack of robustness. David Carleton and Michael Stohl (1987) purport that "utilizing human rights measures derived from different sources, or using slightly different sets of cases, or slightly different sets of economic data, produces substantially different results" [7]. To correct this shortfall, in my study I have included two human rights measures—one utilizing the Political Terror Scale,

and the other employing a Freedom House index. If my models display similar findings across both human rights measures then my results are robust (and hence, not model-dependent), and probably represenatative of a real-world relationship. Another pitfall of prior studies on U.S. human rights policy is that they tend to focus on a small time period (Lai, 2003), a limited geographical area (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985), or both. My research—a large N ('sample') study—seeks to diminish this weakness by employing data over a relatively long time period (1980-2009), a wide range of countries, and all geographical regions.

IV. Hypotheses

I include three primary hypotheses predicting how my independent and control variables will impact my dependent variable (and indicator of U.S. human rights policy), U.S. bilateral foreign assistance allocation ('AID').

HYPOTHESIS #1 (null hypothesis): *I expect that, in determining how much aid a country is to receive, the U.S. considers the human rights record and the economic need of a State only.* I expect this relationship because neo-liberal theory suggests that it is in America's national interest to further international human rights.

HYPOTHESIS #2: *I expect that U.S. human rights policy will be more lenient toward countries rich in natural resources.* I expect this relationship because neo-realist theory proclaims that States will seek to bolster their power wherever possible in order to survive in an anarchic international system. Self-interested States are more likely to value access to natural resources—especially given their increasing scarcity—over protecting foreign individuals' rights.

HYPOTHEIS #3: *I expect that U.S. human rights policy will be more lenient toward countries high in strategic value.* I expect this relationship because the U.S. is unlikely to sacrifice security alliances, for example, in the name of condemning a foreign nation's human rights record. Again, neo-realist theory posits that the U.S. is self-interested and subverts 'soft-power' considerations, like human rights, to strategic factors.

V. Methodology

To determine if and why U.S. international human rights policy is more lenient toward some countries than others, I analyzed seven independent variables and four control variables against my dependent variable (and indicator of U.S. human rights policy) of annual bilateral U.S. foreign assistance. My analysis is based on 29 years of data (1980-2009) across 177 countries. The following table (TABLE I) includes a brief description of all variables included in my dataset.

TABLE I: VARIABLE SUMMARY

| AID	Dependent Variable	U.S. aid as a % of total annual U.S. aid
PTS	Independent Variable	Political Terror Scale human rights measure

FH	Independent Variable	Freedom House human rights measure
ORES/MTLS	Independent Variable	Ores and metals as a % of total exports
ENGYPRD	Independent Variable	Total primary energy production in quadrillion Btu
GDP	Independent Variable	Gross domestic product per capita (in US$)
POP	Independent Variable	Total population
EXPORTS	Independent Variable	Total exports with US (in US$)
MILDIS	Independent Variable	U.S. military manpower distribution
LATCAR	Control Variable	Latin American and Caribbean countries
ISRL/EGYPT	Control Variable	Israel and Egypt
IRAQ	Control Variable	Iraq
AFGHAN	Control Variable	Afghanistan

VI. Results and Discussion

To test my three primary hypotheses, I employ four regression models, which I label Model #1, Model #2, Model #3, and Model #4.

MODEL #1: Model #1 seeks to test hypothesis #2—U.S. human rights policy is more lenient toward countries rich in natural resources—and employs the Political Terror Scale human rights measure (PTS). Based on the results of a multivariate regression, ENGYPRD causes the greatest shift in U.S. foreign assistance allocation. A beta coefficient of .100 indicates that a unit shift in ENGYPRD causes a 10% increase in U.S. foreign assistance. The United States allocates slightly more aid to countries rich in energy resources. Model #1 also shows that the U.S. gives slightly more aid to countries that abuse human rights. PTS yields a beta coefficient of .046: for every unit shift in PTS, U.S. foreign assistance increases by 4.6%. The adjusted R-square for Model #1 is .635: Model #1 explains 63.5% of the variation in U.S. foreign assistance allocation.

FIGURE I: U.S. GIVES SLIGHTLY MORE AID TO COUNTRIES RICH IN ENERGY RESOURCES

MODEL #2: Model #2 also seeks to test the hypothesis that U.S. human rights policy is more lenient toward countries rich in natural resources, but employs the Freedom House human rights measure instead of the Political Terror Scale. If the results of Model #1 and Model #2 are similar (despite using different measures of human rights), than my results are robust and not model dependent. Based on the results of a regression test, ENGYPRD causes the greatest shift in U.S. foreign assistance. A beta coefficient of .098 shows that for every unit shift in ENGYPRD, U.S. foreign assistance increases by 9.8%. The U.S. is again shown to give slightly more aid to countries rich in energy resources. Unlike Model #1, human rights do not appear to affect how much U.S. aid a country receives. The adjusted R-square for Model #2 is .632: Model #2 is explaining 63.2% of the variation in U.S. foreign assistance allocation.

FIGURE II: U.S. GIVES SLIGHTLY MORE AID TO COUNTRIES RICH IN ENERGY RESOURCES


MODEL #3: Model #3 seeks to test hypothesis #3—U.S. human rights policy is more lenient toward countries high in strategic value. It employs the PTS human rights measure but omits the Israel/Egypt control variable. The U.S. purportedly gives more aid to Israel and Egypt because they are strategically valuable: ISRL/EGYPT should therefore not be omitted from the model. Based on the results of a multivariate regression test, PTS causes the greatest shift in U.S. foreign assistance allocation. A beta coefficient of .128 indicates that for every unit increase in PTS, a country is allocated 12.8% more aid. United States human rights policy appears to be more lenient toward countries that abuse human rights. The adjusted R-square for Model #3 is .181: Model #3 explains 18.1% of the variation in U.S. foreign assistance allocation.

FIGURE III: U.S. GIVES SLIGHTLY MORE AID TO COUNTRIES THAT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS

MODEL #4: Model #4 also seeks to test the hypothesis that U.S. human rights policy is more lenient toward countries high in strategic value. It also omits the Israel/Egypt control variable, but employs the Freedom House human rights measure instead of the Political Terror Scale. Based on the results of a regression test, ENGYPRD causes the greatest shift in U.S. foreign assistance allocation. A beta coefficient of .083 indicates that for every unit shift in ENGYPRD, U.S. foreign assistance increases by 8.3%. The adjusted R-square for Model #4 is .168: Model #4 explains 16.8% of the variation in U.S. foreign assistance allocation.

FIGURE IV: U.S. GIVES SLIGHTLY MORE AID TO COUNTRIES RICH IN ENERGY RESOURCES

Limitations

One limitation of my study—like that of prior studies—is a lack of robustness. Models employing the Political Terror Scale human rights measure produced substantially different results than those employing the Freedom House index. Models #1 and #3 (using the Political Terror Scale) resulted in positive beta coefficients that were statistically significant. On the other hand, Models #2 and #4 (using the Freedom House index) produced negative beta coefficients that were not statistically significant. According to models using the Political Terror Scale, the U.S. gives more aid to countries that abuse human rights, even after controlling for other factors. Models using the Freedom House index, on the other hand, indicated that the U.S. does not consider the human rights record of a state *at all* when allocating aid. Due to the lack of robust results, it is difficult to make generalizations about my research.

Another limitation of my research is that the indicators for natural resources do not capture all possible aspects of the natural resource wealth of a country. I only included two natural resource indicators—one capturing energy resources and another measuring ores and minerals wealth. Although these indicators are important, they do not contain all possible aspects of a nation's natural resource wealth. The results of my study, therefore, may be missing possible determinant factors of U.S. human rights policy. For further research, I would include a wider range of natural resource indicators in my study.

Conclusion

My research has sought to examine the role of natural resources, strategic assets, and human rights in U.S. foreign assistance allocation. Specifically, my research sought to answer the question: Why is U.S. human rights policy more lenient toward some countries than others? I have hypothesized that U.S. human rights policy is (1) more lenient toward countries rich in natural resources and (2) more lenient toward countries high in strategic value. Based on the results of four regression models, I come to a couple general conclusions.

U.S. international human rights policy appears to be more lenient toward countries rich in energy resources. In three out of four models, ENGYPRD had the greatest influence on U.S. foreign assistance allocation. In addition, my research implies that human rights do not appear to be a motivating factor in U.S. foreign assistance allocation. Model #1 and #3 (using the Political Terror Scale human rights measure) show that the U.S. gives more aid to human rights violators while Models #2 and #4 (using the Freedom House human rights measure) indicate that human rights is not a consideration at all when allocating U.S. foreign assistance.

I conclude that natural resources appear to play a role in U.S. foreign assistance allocation, while strategic assets (at least those captured by my variables) do not. Human rights considerations only play a minor role in U.S. foreign assistance policy, contrary to what American laws and legislation would suggest.

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